Fiscal decentralization, Ideology and Political Legislation Cycles: A Test on the Italian Regions

Fabio Padovano (Università Roma Tre)
Youssoufa Sy (University of Nantes)

Abstract

This study tests the implications of Political Legislation Cycles (PLC) in the legislative production of the Italian Regions from 2000 to 2024. The PLC theory highlights a dynamic distortion in policy decisions driven by electoral incentives, which prompts legislators to concentrate the approval of laws near the end of the legislature and can be interpreted as a measure of lack of political accountability. Focusing on Italian Regions, this research sheds light on how fiscal decentralization influences legislative behavior. Our findings reveal discernible legislative cycles primarily within Regions with an Ordinary Statute (RSOs), characterized by lower fiscal autonomy and competencies compared to the Special Statute (RSS) Regions. Furthermore, legislative cycles’ magnitude is more pronounced in regions in Central and Southern Italy compared to Northern regions. Some evidence that regions governed by left wing coalitions are associated with cycles of greater magnitude is also found. Political alignment of regional coalitions with the central government’s majority is also found to positively impact the size of the observed cycles.

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