SOCIETÀ ITALIANA DI DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA
Selçukhan Ünekbaş (European University Institute)
Abstract
Competitiveness has been a long-running problem for the European Union. Addressing the EU's "competitiveness crisis" would require a holistic approach. However, as the tool for ensuring that competition in the internal market remains undistorted, antitrust law is likely to be a significant tool in boosting European competitiveness. That said, exactly how antitrust law can contribute to competitiveness is rarely explored. This Article conjectures how antitrust law would look like if it's goal was to support European competitiveness. We hypothesize that EU economic law in general operates in a division of labour. While free movement and harmonization measures create an integrated market with enlarged resources, thereby enabling firms to scale, antitrust rules ensure that the economic resources thus created flow away from unproductive firms and toward productive firms. We operationalize this hypothesis in two steps. First, we model a prioritization matrix, according to which enforcers can allocate cases to free movement or antitrust intervention. The model is tested in four industries deemed crucial for European competitiveness. Second, for those industries where antitrust enforcement would be beneficial, we show how enforcers can operationalize exclusionary conduct law to promote productivity, thereby contributing to competitiveness. The overall conclusion is the following: in cases where productive firms are failing to capture market share over time, antitrust enforcement can support competitiveness by selectively protecting productive firms, thereby restoring the corrective function of markets.