The Impact of Attorneys’ Abundance on Litigation Quality. Evidence from France.

Umberto Nizza (University of Torino & Stanford University)

Abstract

This study examines the impact of lawyer concentration on litigation outcomes in French civil courts. Using a novel dataset and a multidimensional approach, the paper suggest that higher lawyer concentration is negatively correlated with court outcome. In particular, the evidence suggests that higher attorneys’ concentration is associated with an increase number of rejections of plaintiffs' lawsuits, a proxy of frivolous lawsuits. In essence, if there are more lawyers competing for clients there is a rise in strategic litigation, with weaker cases introduced in court to secure fees even if rejection is likely. The results confirm theories about lawyer-stimulated demand and draw attention to potential quality issues in legal representation under excessive competition. Policy implications are drawn to address issues impairing judicial efficiency and access to fair outcomes.

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