The Role of Social Norms in Anti-Coordination with Asymmetric Income Distribution

Lorenzo Spadoni (Università di Cassino)
Pietro Guarnieri (University of Pisa)

Abstract

In this experimental study, we investigate the influence of social norms on anti-
coordination behavior in scenarios with asymmetric income distribution. Previous
research demonstrates that individuals can successfully anti-coordinate by alternately
making sacrifices (Diekmann & Przepiorka, 2016), targeting those better positioned for
the sacrifice, such as those with lower associated costs (Diekmann & Przepiorka, 2016)
or higher endowments (Cherry et al., 2013). Guarnieri & Spadoni (2024) explore the
role of social norms in anti-coordination, finding that individuals often act according to
personal beliefs and social empirical expectations, rather than maximizing payoffs. We
extend this literature by eliciting social norms conditioned on different endowments
using the Krupka & Weber (2013) method. This approach allows us to demonstrate
that wealth distribution is not merely a focal point for anti-coordination (Cherry et al.,
2013), but also a trigger for anti-coordination based on commonly perceived notions
of the right thing to do. Our experimental design includes two distinct games with
three players, manipulating the number of high-income participants exogenously: the
Volunteer Dilemma (Diekmann, 1985), where the social optimum involves two players
receiving higher payoffs, and the novel Deserver Dilemma, where the social optimum
results in only one player obtaining a higher payoff.

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