SOCIETÀ ITALIANA DI DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA
Bartłomiej Biga (Cracow University of Economics)
Abstract
Contemporary business projects are exceptionally complex. They require the control of a vast array of property (both tangible and intellectual). For instance, compare what was required to make economic use of the steam engine (a pivotal innovation of the 18th century) with the numerous elements of property needed today to deliver critical systems such as operating systems or electronic devices. Michael Heller highlighted the problem of fragmented ownership in his work. He termed this phenomenon the Tragedy of the Anticommons. However, this issue gains particular significance in the context of the dispersion of intellectual property, an aspect Heller essentially did not address.
This text addresses the danger of suboptimal use of intangible resources in situations where intellectual property is fragmented, and economic viability is only achievable when actions are undertaken in relation to a larger bundle. In other words, it analyzes the effects of intellectual property fragmentation, which grants many entities exclusive rights to use a resource (or parts of a resource) but simultaneously prevents all from utilizing the larger whole, which is the only economically viable option.
This analysis also considers the contemporary weakening of the institution of property. On one hand, this weakening represents a reduction in one of the owner's rights (the ability to exclude others from using a good), which can contribute to mitigating the scale of the Tragedy of the Anticommons. On the other hand, a weaker institution of property hinders achieving a sufficiently high level of resource control, which also complicates the economic utilization of property, albeit for different reasons than those described in the Tragedy of the Anticommons.